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Abstract 
In Italy, medically assisted procreation is governed by Law 40/2004. The said law has 
been subject to several changes over the past ten years, which have redesigned the face 
of it so as to make it an example of re-writing a legal text. Even today, many problems 
still need to be seen to that require a rethinking of the family model, parenthood, and 
the existence of a right to procreative freedom. The various currents of feminism have 
welcomed the advent of new reproductive technologies differently. Intended to broaden 
women’s rights, these new technologies have also opened up new forms of subjection 
and exploitation.
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Resumen
En Italia la procreación médicamente asistida se rige por la Ley 40 de 2004. Esta ley 
ha sido sujeto de múltiples cambios en los últimos diez años, que han rediseñado su 
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apariencia hasta convertirla en una especie de referente de cómo se reescribe un texto 
legal. Incluso, hoy en día, muchos problemas deben ser vistos como un replanteamiento 
del modelo familiar, la paternidad y la existencia de un derecho a la libertad procreativa. 
Diferentes corrientes del feminismo han acogido el advenimiento de nuevas tecnologías 
reproductivas de manera diversa, ya que, si bien supuestamente fueron creadas para 
ampliar los derechos de las mujeres, también han dado lugar a nuevas formas de explo-
tación y sometimiento. 
Palabras clave 
Procreación asistida, nuevas tecnologías, explotación, maternidad subrogada, liber-
tad procreativa.
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1. As is well-known, medically assisted procreation is a relatively recent practice: the 
first experiments date back to the late 1960s, but only in 1978 the first artificially insem-
inated child, Louise Brown, was born in England.1
There has been no legislation in Italy for a long time: the difficulty of regulating this 
practice from a purely legal point of view, besides its ideological aspects, arises from the 
multiple problems stemming from the proliferation of subjects involved in the repro-
ductive process. Subjects that bring a potential conflict of interest between them (bio-
logical parents, the embryo, the future child, any sperm or egg donors, doctors). This 
gap in legislation was overdue for over twenty years and only in 2004 did Law 40 come 
about (the “Medically Assisted Reproductive Law”), and finally passed by the Chamber 
after five hours of debate, with 277 votes in favor, 222 against, and 3 abstentions.
The very rigid system of the law, with a strong repression, caused more problems, 
and just a year later, in April 2005, the referendum campaign aimed at declaring the 
unconstitutionality of the entire law was started. However, the Constitutional Court2 
rejected the overall referendum on the basis of the assertion that Law 40 must be con-
sidered constitutionally necessary, as it provides the first organic regulation ensuring a 
minimum level of protection for a number of situations of significant constitutional 
interest. Furthermore, it contained four partial referendums on the most controversial 
points of the law, such as the possibility of access to medically assisted procreation not 
only by sterile couples but also to those with genetically transmissible pathologies, the 
limits to experimental research and the prohibition of heterologous fertilization. On 
June 12th and 13th, 2005, a referendum was held and failed due to lack of quorum.3
Law 40 has been subject to several changes over the past ten years or so, which have 
redesigned the face of it so as to make it an example of re-writing a legal text.4
In the initial formulation, it was severely detrimental to women’s health: a “bad bad 
law”, as it was defined5, reducing the woman’s body to a mere container of the conceived, 
sacrificing her right to health (I refer in particular to Article 14 banning the production 
of more than three embryos and the consequent obligation of a single and simultaneous 
implant) and Article 13 (on the prohibition of pre-implantation).
1. Cfr. C. Flamigni, La procreazione assistita. Fertitlità e sterilità tra medicina e considerazioni bioetiche, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2011.
2. Cost, 13/01/2015 no. 45, in the Gazzetta Ufficiale 02/02/2005 no. 5.
3. Cfr. M. Ainis (ed.), I referendum sulla fecondazione assistita, Giuffrè, Milano, 2005.
4. Cfr. G. Ferrando, “La riscrittura costituzionale e giurisprudenziale della legge sulla procreazione assistita”, in Famiglia e 
diritto, 5, 2011; C. Flamigni and N. Mori, La fecondazione assistita dopo dieci anni di Legge 40: Meglio ricominciare da capo!, 
Ananke, Torino, 2014.
5. Cfr. M. Virgilio and M. R. Marella, “Una cattiva legge cattiva”, in Un’appropriazione indebita: L’uso del corpo della donna 
nella nuova legge sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, Baldini & Castoldi, Milano, 2004.
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The articles of the failed referendum were then brought before the Constitutional 
Court. By ruling 151 of the 8th May 20096, the Court declared the constitutional illegality 
of Article 14, stating that the provision of the law is in contravention of article 32 of the 
Constitution, as it affects the right to women’s health. If the first attempt at implanta-
tion is unsuccessful then a second painful and invasive ovarian stimulation is required, 
aimed at the formation of new embryos for a second implant. The Court also notes the 
unreasonableness of Article 14, which provides for the same treatment for all women 
without taking into account the specific situations which must be assessed case by case 
in the medical/patient relationship. The Court, therefore, reiterated the principle un-
derlined in Article 14, namely banning the creation of a number of embryos exceeding 
the necessary level, but considered it reasonable to entrust the physician with a case-
by-case determination of how many embryos to produce and implant in relation to the 
individual women’s health conditions.
Subsequently, with two sentences in 2015, no. 96 of the 5th June 20157 and no. 229 
of 11th November 20158 respectively, the Court accepted, with the former, that fertile 
couples carrying genetic diseases could access medically assisted procreation (the pre-
vious Article 1 only allowed this to couples suffering from infertility or sterility) and, 
secondly, the selection of embryos if they were suffering from serious transmissible dis-
eases, i.e. pathologies that meet the severity criteria for abortion in virtue of Law 194 
of 1978 (“Rules for the Social Protection of Maternity and Voluntary Termination of 
Pregnancy”). The Court has once again intended to protect the health of women who 
would otherwise have to resort to abortion after the implant: in fact, if the law allows 
for the voluntary termination of pregnancy in order to prevent compromising the psy-
cho-physical integrity of a woman by the prospect of generating a severely ill child, it 
seems unreasonable to impose the implantation of an embryo with a serious anomaly 
on a woman, and then force her to abort it.
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg pronounced on the case of 
Costa and Pavan c. Italy (August 28th, 2012) 9 and noted the inconsistency of Italian law, 
which offers stronger protection to the embryo than to the fetus when it bans couples 
carrying genetic diseases to access medically assisted procreation and to select embryos 
carrying no disease, but then allows for abortion once a pregnancy begins with a fetus 
bearing that illness.
6. In G.U. 13/05/2009 no. 19.
7. In G.U. 10/06/2015 no. 23.
8. In G.U. 18/11/2015 no. 46.
9. Appeal no. 54270/10.
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2. In 2014, with judgment no. 162 of the 9th April10, the Constitutional Court also 
ruled that medically assisted procreation of a heterologous type was unlawful11 (provid-
ed for in Article 4, paragraph 3, of Law 40). It should be noted that in Italy since the late 
1970s, when medically assisted procreation spread, until 2004 (the year in which Law 40 
came into force) heterologous fertilization was practiced, but regulated by ministerial 
decrees. One particular decree was the Degan of 1985, which provided that the donor 
had to be anonymous and that the donation was to be made without payment. From 
2004 to 2014 the ban then came into place.
The ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2014 was preceded by an intervention 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg12, which in 2010 condemned 
Austria for the absolute ban –provided by the law of that country as was the case in Italy 
too– of the donation of eggs, as it was considered incompatible with the principles laid 
down in the ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights of 1950) in article 8 on 
respect for the right to private and family life and article 14 on the principle of equality.
In February 2011, the Grand Chamber in Strasbourg reformulated this decision, 
believing that the prohibition by Austrian law did not go beyond the margin of ap-
preciation granted to the European states. In particular, it stated that this ban was an 
expression of a non-censurable balance between the right to parenthood and the need 
to preserve certainty in family relationships, with particular reference to the possible 
conflict between genetic mother and biological mother, and the interest of the individ-
ual to know their genetic origins.
In 2014, the Italian Constitutional Court based the declaration of illegitimacy of 
medically assisted heterologous procreation on the following points:
-The Constitution includes fundamental and general freedom of self-determination 
(Articles 2, 3, and 31), AND the choice to become a parent and to form a family is one of 
these expressions. In particular, Article 31 gives the Republic the task of facilitating the 
formation of families by means of economic and other measures. Law 40 is to be seen as 
follows: it is explicitly intended to “remove the causes of infertility or sterility”. But het-
erologist prohibition is to be considered unreasonable in light of the purpose of the law 
itself, as it prevents completely sterile subjects accessing medically assisted procreation 
10. In G. U. 18/06/2014 no. 26. Cfr. M. D’Amico, M. P. Costantini (eds.), L’illegittimità costituzionale del divieto di feconda-
zione eterologa: Analisi critica e materiali, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2014.
11. As the renowned gynecologist Carlo Flamigni emphasized on several occasions, the term “heterologous” makes it pos-
sible to think of reproductive meetings between subjects of different species. From the scientific point of view, it would be 
more appropriate to define it as “exogamic reproduction”, i.e. with eggs from total strangers.
12. Sentence dated 1st April 2010, S. e H. c. Austria, appeal no. 57813/2000.
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techniques to form a family that needs donor eggs. In other words, irrelevance lies in 
the fact that the law guarantees access to assisted medical procreation to those who are 
ill but denies it to those with more serious illnesses. 
-In addition, the Constitution guarantees the right to health (Art. 32), traditionally 
being psychophysical well-being. The inability to form a family with children can ad-
versely affect the health of the couple.
Once the freedom of self-determination in family matters (Articles 2, 3 and 31) and 
the right to a couple’s health (Art. 32) have been clarified, the Court states that, in order 
to impose prohibitions or limitations on the rights of persons, then equivalent rank 
rights that would be lost need to be individuated. In the case of heterologic fertilization, 
what are the interests/rights that would be damaged? Possible traumas from non-natu-
ral parenting and the possible compression of the right of the offspring to know his or 
her genetic origins. But such profiles, referring to possible situations that have not been 
demonstrated, are not as such as to prevail over the above-mentioned rights (self-deter-
mination and health).
Therefore, the rules prohibiting heterologous fertilization lead to a disparity of treat-
ment: at first glance, with reference to the severity of the dysfunction of the couple and, 
under another profile, with reference to economic abilities. Those with economic means 
may resort to treatment abroad where medically assisted heterosexual procreation is a 
permitted practice.13
In light of all this, the Court ruled that the prohibition of heterology was unethical 
for unreasonable disproportion, as “the censured rules do not respect the least possi-
ble sacrifice of other constitutionally protected interests and values and instead make a 
clear and irreversible injury to some of the them” (self-determination and health).
As a result of this ruling, some have found a regulatory vacuum and, therefore, the 
need for new intervention by the legislator. However, the Court itself pointed out, in 
the final part of the judgment, that there is no vacuum, since Law 40 acknowledges 
the legitimacy of medically assisted heterosexual procreation in many countries, it had 
already provided for Article 9 to regulate the state of the child’s birth: “Whenever med-
ically assisted heterosexual procreation techniques are used, the spouse or cohabitant 
whose consent can only be obtained by means of concluding acts cannot exercise the 
act of rejecting the paternity”; that “the mother of a baby resulting from the application 
of medically assisted procreation techniques cannot declare the will not to be named”; 
13. See, in particular, A. Borini, C. Flamigni, Fecondazione e(s)terologa, L’Asino d’oro, Roma, 2012.
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that “in the case of heterologous techniques, the egg donor does not acquire any paren-
tal legal relationship with the baby and cannot claim any right or obligation to do so”.
So, in the opinion of the Court, there is no gap in the subjective requirements of 
the provisions of Article 5: “access to medically assisted procreation techniques may be 
granted to married or cohabiting heterosexual adults of a potentially fertile age, who 
are both living”.
Lastly, there is no problem with regard to authorized structures, which remain those 
provided for in Articles 10 and 11, that is to say, public and private facilities authorized 
by the regions and registered in a special register.
Finally, we call upon:
-The Legislative Decree no. 191, “Implementation of the Directive 2004/23/EC on 
the definition of quality and safety standards for the donation, procurement, control, 
processing, conserving, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells” with ref-
erence to the gratuity and willingness of the donations; the modalities of consent; the 
anonymity of the donor; health care; etc.
-The law of no. 184 dated May 4, 1983, regarding adoptions, and amendments made 
by Legislative Decree 154 of 2013, with particular reference to the issue of genetic identity.
3. On July 1, 2015, the Ministry of Health, in the light of technical-scientific de-
velopments and judgments of the Constitutional Court, issued a decree updating the 
guidelines of Law 40 and substituting those of 2008, largely inspired by the document 
of State-region conference approved in September 2014, following the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court.14
With reference to the heterology, it is to be pointed out that the donation must be 
anonymous in the sense that it should not be possible for the donor to trace the receiv-
ing pair and vice versa. Furthermore, it must be free of charge, with the exclusion of the 
reimbursement of expenses. It has been highlighted that it is not possible to choose the 
phenotypic characteristics of the donor in order to avoid unlawful eugenic selections 
but that the medically assisted procreation centre should reasonably ensure the compat-
ibility of the donor’s main features with those of the receiving pair, so as to avoid that 
the child’s appearance is not too dissimilar to that of the parents.
14. Newsletter no. 2557 dated 8th September 2014, available at www.regioni/it.
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The problems of implementing the heterologous discipline in Italy are still numer-
ous, beginning with the number of male donors and especially female ones (in this re-
gard an adequate information campaign is lacking), which makes it necessary to import 
eggs from abroad.
Two years after the ruling of the Constitutional Court, the Italian Fertility Society 
(SIFE) issued some very worrying data: there were just a dozen female donors (against 
the 500/600 that would be needed each year), one hundred or so female donors through 
eggsharing, i.e. women in treatment for medically assisted procreation who give part of 
their oocytes. One of the reasons for these numbers is to be found in the fact that, as has 
been said, the donation in Italy is entirely free, whereas in other countries it is an entire-
ly different story (e.g. in Spain where a law provides for a fee of about 1000 euros). This 
creates a clear controversy: paid donation is forbidden, but oocytes can be obtained 
from other countries at a price.15
Only since this year (March 2017) the heterology services have been included in 
the National Health Service’s LEA (Essential Support Levels), which should avoid large 
territorial differences concerning the possibility of access and reimbursement and the 
continuation of the so-called procreative tourism, both from region to region (until 
March only in three regions –Tuscany, Emilia-Romagna, and Friuli– access was opera-
tional with redeemability), as well as towards foreign countries.
Besides these practical problems, I would like to emphasize three open questions of 
great bioethical importance.
The first question concerns Article 13 (still in force) of Law 40, which prohibits any 
experimentation on human embryos, except for therapeutic and diagnostic purposes 
aimed at protecting the health and the development of the embryo itself. The prohi-
bition also affects the cryo-preserved supernumerary embryos produced before the 
entry into force of Law 40 and after the Constitutional Court ruling of 2009, which 
eliminated the limit of three embryos to be produced and implanted. Consequently, 
even the latter cannot be donated for research. The provision of Article 13 has been 
the subject of judgment before the European Court of Human Rights (Case Parrillo 
c. Italy, 27 August 2015)16. Adelina Parrillo, in 2002, before Law 40 entered into force, 
along with her companion Stefano Rolla, had decided to access medically assisted 
procreation techniques in order to produce embryos to be implanted at a later date. 
15. For an in-depth discussion of this aspect, see: N. J. Kenney, M. L. McGowan, “Egg Donation Compensation: Ethical and 
Legal Challenges”, in Medicolegal and Bioethics, 4, 2014, pp. 15-24; A. Curtis, “Giving Til’ It Hurts: Egg Donation and the 
Costs of Altruism”, in Feminist Formations, 22, 2, 2010, pp. 80-100.
16. Appeal no. 46470/2011.
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However, in 2003 she lost her companion who was killed in Nassiriya, and the widow 
gave up on the idea of transferring the embryos, but expressed the desire to donate 
them to scientific research. Her request was refused by the healthcare facility where 
the embryos were kept. This refusal was motivated by the fact that Law 40 under Law 
13 prohibited any embryo research. So Mrs. Parrillo decided to resort directly to the 
European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the prohibition stated in Article 13 
violates Article 1 of Protocol No 1.1, annexed to the text of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (“Protection of property”), Article 8 (“Right to respect for private 
and family life”), and Article 10 (“Freedom of expression” where scientific freedom 
can be considered an aspect). The Grand Chamber on 27 August 2015 declares that 
the application is inadmissible: with respect to Article 1, Protocol 1, the Court em-
phasizes that the scope of the rule is strictly of an economic-capital nature and cannot 
therefore refer to the case in question. With respect to Article 8, while recognizing that 
the embryos contain genetic material belonging to the applicant and are therefore to 
be considered as constituting genetic and biological identity, the Court considers that 
this does not directly affect respect for private and family life. This also takes into ac-
count that there is no evidence of will in the same sense from the companion. Finally, 
in Article 10, the Court holds that the alleged violation should have been submitted 
by a researcher, who is the holder of the right to freedom of expression, in the sense 
of the right to scientific freedom, and not by others.
Article 13 of Law 40 also issued the Constitutional Court with Judgment no. 8417 
dated 22 March 2016 following a lawsuit filed at the Law Court of Florence, to which a 
couple had turned to order that their nine cryopreserved embryos held by an assisted 
fertilization center be sent to medical and scientific research. The Consult, explicitly 
referring to the ruling of the Court of Strasbourg, emphasizes the intangibility of legis-
lative choice to safeguard the dignity of the embryo at the expense of freedom of scien-
tific research and considers that only the legislator “as the interpreter of the will of the 
community” can be called to translate the balancing of basic values into conflict, taking 
into account the orientations and instances rooted in social consciousness at the given 
moment. This ruling, therefore, sends the legislator a warning to decide on the fate of 
human embryos in perpetual cryopreservation that could be used in scientific research 
or even –may I add– “adopted” because of the low number of male sperm donors/fe-
male egg donors.
17. In G.U. 20/04/2016 no. 16.
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The second question, however, concerns the anonymity of either donor provided in 
the 2015 guidelines. This is a more general topic involving other institutions such as the 
adoption and anonymity of the mother who chooses, as envisaged in Italy, to give birth 
to a hospital without being identified.
In 2011, therefore, before the heterologist prohibition was dropped in Italy, the Na-
tional Committee for Bioethics, took note of the 2010 Recommendation of the Council 
of Europe’s Bioethics Steering Committee to the States which prohibited the heterology 
from drafting protective rules of the identity rights to the newborn, expressed itself 
with an opinion (“Knowing Their Biological Origins in Medically Assisted Heterologist 
Procreation”)18 that can be summarized in the following points:
-Parents are recommended to tell their children how they were conceived using ap-
propriate ways, so as to prevent any genetic testing from revealing the secret later on and 
causing unpredictable reactions.
-The facility where the medically assisted procreation has been performed must 
keep appropriate registers containing the genetic data of the male donor/female donor 
necessary for any diagnostic/therapeutic treatment of the child in the future.
With regard to the right of the child to know its origins, by accessing the biological 
data of both donors, some have, on the one hand, emphasized the importance of compre-
hensive data (both genetic and personal information) of who gave the eggs, arguing that 
every individual has the right to know the truth, and if this was prevented he or she would 
be a victim of violence. Others, on the other hand, have argued the need to preserve ano-
nymity, arguing that the bond with the donor is biological and not relational, and there-
fore does not add anything to the child’s background, and would risk family balance.19
From a legal point of view, with reference in particular to the aforementioned insti-
tution of the mother’s anonymity, the Italian constitutional court expressed the right 
to confidentiality of women in 2005 as well as the European Court of Human Rights 
of Strasbourg in 2012, with the judgment of Godelli c. Italy20. The Court of Strasbourg 
considered that the prohibition of access provided for in Italian law violated Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and that Italy did not seek to establish a 
18. Comitato Nazionale per la Bioetica, “I Pareri e le Risposte”, nd, available at http://bioetica.governo.it/it/documen-
ti/i-pareri-e-le-risposte/.
19. Cfr. V. Ravitsky, “The Right to Know One’s Genetic Origins and Cross-Border Medically Assisted Reproduction”, in 
Israel Journal of Health Policy Research, 6, 3, 2017; I. de Melo-Martin, “How Best to Protect the Vital Interests of Do-
nor-Conceived Individuals: Prohibiting or Mandating Anonymity in Gamete Donations?”, in Reproductive BioMedicine 
and Society Online, 2017, available at http://www.rbmsociety.com/article/S2405-6618(17)30013-8/pdf; M. Sabatello, 
“Regulating Gamete Donation in the U.S.: Ethical, Legal and Social Implications”, in Laws, 4, 3, 2015, pp. 352-76.
20. Sentence dated 25 September 2012, Appeal no. 33783/2009. For a reconstruction cfr. L. Califano, “Il diritto all’anoni-
mato della madre naturale”, in Id., Privacy: Affermazione pratica di un diritto fondamentale, ESI, Napoli, 2016, pp. 181-98.
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balance between the rights of the parties concerned (the privacy of the woman and the 
right to the personal identity of the child). By analogy, these arguments may also apply 
to the case of medically assisted heterozygous procreation.
The third question concerns gestation for others or surrogate maternity21, which is 
a type of medically assisted procreation that is prohibited in Italy. As previously stat-
ed, Law 40, even after its re-writing, recognizes access to homologous or heterologous 
assisted procreation techniques only to “adult heterosexual couples that are married or 
cohabiting, potentially fertile, and both living”.
Cases of gestation for others are slowly becoming more common in Italy. The orig-
inal Decree on Civil Unions (which became Law No. 76 on May 20th, 2016) provided 
for the possibility of so-called stepchild adoption, i.e. the possibility of recognition of 
the parental bond to those who did not contribute biologically to the birth of the child, 
but this part was then excluded when it came to approving the decree. In the absence of 
legislation, two different roads have been taken:
-In some cases, the possibility of transcribing the birth of a child “obtained from 
surrogate maternity” in the registers of the Italian registry has been allowed in a state 
that disciplines it if there is a genetic bond of some sort.
-In the case, however, of a surrogate child with no biological bond to the contract-
ing couple, in the interest of the minor, the state of abandonment is to be declared and 
therefore he or she can be adopted. 
This second orientation is also reflected in the recent judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg of 24 January 2017 in the case of Paradiso and 
Campanelli c. Italy. 22
A married Italian couple went to Russia to satisfy their desire of a child through a 
maternity surrogacy agreement (which was however concealed by the Russian author-
ities at the time of the birth of the child). Back in Italy, they requested that the birth 
be registered in Italy, which was rejected, given the offense of false attestations and the 
complete absence of a genetic bond. The Juvenile Court of Campobasso, therefore, ini-
tiated proceedings for the declaration of adoptability of the child. The spouses appealed 
21. To indicate that form of pregnancy when a woman, with or without consideration, carries a pregnancy for others with 
the intent to entrust the baby to intentional parents without claiming any rights to the child, the preferred terminology is 
“gestation for others” in as neutral as “surrogate maternity”, clearly disreputable (the term “surrogate” refers to something 
that pretends to be authentic and is not) or “uterus to rent”, where the use of a part for everything is obscured by the sub-
jectivity of the woman.
22. Appeal no. 25358/2012.
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against the Italian State to the European Court of Human Rights for violation of article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to respect for private and fam-
ily life). In the first instance, the Court accepted the appeal, but the Grand Chambre 
issued a second sentence, completely subverting the previous decision. It supported this 
second decision by stating that there was no biological bond and, above all, their rela-
tionship had been very brief (six months), and consequently did not constitute a solid 
family relationship. For these reasons, the Court considered the ruling of the Italian 
judges to be reasonable, as the question was ethically sensitive, with respect to which the 
States should enjoy a broad margin of appreciation.
Various openings can be found in the ruling of the Court of Trento of the 23rd Febru-
ary 2017, by which the Court maintained that the refusal of the Civil Registrar to tran-
scribe a foreign judgment recognizing dual male parenthood to a child born abroad, 
for being contrary to public order, was illegal. The Court argued that the failure to 
recognize the status filiationis in relation to the non-biological father would cause an 
obvious injury to the child. Furthermore, no rights would be recognized to him. It is 
argued that the protection of this principle goes beyond any reference to the prohibition 
of gestation for others as “the recognition of the deformity of the fertilization practice 
by virtue of which children were born, compared to those considered legitimate by the 
current rules of medically assisted procreation and should not result in the denial of the 
status filitiationis legitimately acquired abroad”.
Besides the specific problems affecting Italy, the issue of medically assisted pro-
creation requires wider reflection with regard to the family model and parenting and 
whether or not there is a right to freedom of procreation.23
As pointed out by the European Court of Human Rights with regard to the appli-
cability of Article 8 of the Convention when talking about the family model, not only 
to spouses, but also to heterosexual or homosexual couples that cohabit more uxorio:
The State, in choosing means to protect the family and ensure the respect for fam-
ily life provided for in Article 8, must necessarily take into account the evolution 
of society and change in the perception of social issues and civil status and rela-
tions, and include the fact that there is not just one way or choice to lead family 
or private life.24 
23. Cfr. P. R. Brezina, Y. Zhao, “The Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Impacted by Modern Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies”, in Obstetrics and Gynecology International, 2012, article ID 686253, doi:10.1155/2012/686253.
24. Sentence 19th February 2013, appeal no. 19010/07.
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As for parenting, it is necessary to realize that the certainty enshrined in the ancient 
saying mater semper certa (or rather “the mother of the child is always known”) seems to 
crumble nowadays and the reference figures are multiple: the genetic mother (giving the 
fertilized egg), the biological mother (who lives the gestation ), the social mother (who 
takes on the responsibility of the newborn), the paternal father, the biological father (the 
donor), and therefore the rights/duties of these different figures need to be balanced.
Finally, as regards the right to procreative freedom25, this is to be included in the con-
text of the so-called “procreative revolution.” Following the rapid development of new 
reproductive technologies, biology is no longer a destiny: contraception allows you to 
choose when/how to reproduce or not to reproduce at all (so-called negative procreative 
rights), as well as choose how to reproduce. It ranges, for example, to freezing your eggs 
to use them at a time in life that is more suitable for you, to the procreation for sterile or 
infertile couples with transmissible genetic diseases, to the procreation with donor eggs 
and surrogate mothers (so-called positive procreative rights).
The decision to have a child –as the Italian Constitutional Court cites in the above-
mentioned ruling– “concerning the most intimate and intangible sphere of the human 
person, cannot be compulsory unless it fails other constitutional values”. Self-determi-
nation in life and body, citing Stefano Rodotà26, represents the most intense and extreme 
point of existential freedom.
The different currents of feminism have greeted the advent of new technologies in 
the field of reproduction very differently. The ability of such techniques has been ar-
gued. On the one hand, they broaden the rights and freedom of choice and self-deter-
mination of women; on the other hand, they open new frontiers to the subjection and 
exploitation of women’s bodies27.
Under the latter profile, the most controversial theme is the so-called gestation for 
others or surrogacy pregnancies. As we have seen in Italy, and in most European coun-
tries, this practice is banned. Some countries only recognize the altruistic form (e.g. UK, 
 
25. See, among others, P. Iagulli, Diritti riproduttivi e riproduzione artificiale: Verso un nuovo diritto umano? Profili ricostrut-
tivi e valutazioni biogiuridiche, Giappichelli, Torino, 2001; M. Warnock, Fare bambini: Esiste un diritto ad avere figli?, Einau-
di, Torino, 2004; A. D’Aloia, “La procreazione come diritto della persona”, in S. Canestrari, G. Ferrando, C. M. Mazzoni, S. 
Rodotà, P. Zatti (a cura di), Trattato di biodiritto: Il governo del corpo, Giuffrè, Milano, 2011, pp. 1341-1371.
26. S. Rodotà, Il diritto di avere diritti, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2013, p. 251.
27. By way of merely exemplifying the feminist debate, reference is made to V. Schalev, Birth Power. The Case for Surrogacy, 
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989; C. Pateman, The sexual contract, Stanford University press, Stanford, 1988; M. Co-
oper, C. Waldby, Clinical Labor: Tissue Donors and Research Subjects in the Global Bioeconomy, Duke University Press, 
Durham, 2014; S. Pozzolo, “Gestazione per altri (ed altre): Spunti per un dibattito in (una) prospettiva femminista”, in 
Rivista di biodiritto, 2, 2016, pp. 93-110.
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Greece, Belgium, many US states), few also recognize the commercial form (e.g. Cali-
fornia, Russia, Ukraine)28.
The policy of the European states, contrary to marketing, is reflected in various 
international legislation: Article 21 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and 
Medicine states that “the human body and its parts should not be as such forms of prof-
it”. Article 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides the 
same “prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial 
gain”. The EC Directive 2004/23, referred to, as we have seen, the Italian Constitutional 
Court in the 2014 judgment, Article 12 prohibits the sale of human tissue, allowing 
only the payment of compensation strictly limited to making good the expenses and 
the problems resulting from the donation. In light of this directive, some countries, as 
already stated, regulate the altruistic-solidarity form of egg donation, comparing it to 
the donation of blood or organs.
The discordance of standardization has prompted the Hague Conference Council, 
since 2010, to find uniform solutions to issues of international law and to address the 
issue, and has commissioned a group of experts to advance proposals for common solu-
tions. The report prepared in February 2017 states that, given the complexity of the 
phenomenon of transnational gestation and the various legislative approaches of the 
states, “it is not yet possible to reach a definitive conclusion on the actual possibility of 
identifying and applying common rules of international law concerning recognition of 
parental responsibility”.
While requiring further discussions and considerations, the Council has identified 
two main objectives. The first one is to ensure the certainty and stability of the legal sta-
tus of surrogate children for others, which must be acknowledged by all States, and the 
second to ensure that gestation for others is conducted in the respect of human rights 
and the well-being of all persons involved in the proceedings.
28. See C. Casonato, T. E. Frosini (eds.), La fecondazione assistita nel diritto comparato, Giappichelli, Torino, 2006; K. Trim-
mings, P. Beaumont (ed.), International Surrogacy Arrangements: Legal Regulation at the International Level, Hart Publish-
ing, Oxford e Portland, Oregon, 2013.
